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1. WHAT IS UCC?
We are seeing the rapid growth of an unusual form of production for informa-
tion resources on the Internet. The defining characteristics are that much of
the information provided by a producer is donated to the producer, by people
not employed by the producer. There are several names for this production
technology; we favor user-contributed content (typically there is no boundary
between contributors and users of the content).1
Many information producers now significantly (though rarely exclusively)
rely on a user-contributed production model. Many are successful and quite
socially valuable. We survey several different categories of such information ser-
vices in this chapter. Well-known examples include Wikipedia articles; Amazon
product reviews; Flickr photos; Digg news stories; del.icio.us Web bookmarks;
CiteULike scholarly citations; open-source software projects such as Linux and
the Apache web server; Peer2Patent comments on patent applications; the Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and WorldCat library cataloguing. Of course,
for every success, there are numerous failures.
Providing product created and donated by volunteers seems like a great idea;
why didn’t anyone think of this before? Of course, the idea is not new: Tom
Sawyer induced his friends and neighbors to whitewash Aunt Polly’s fence for
him.2 More generally, user-contributed content is clearly related to the private
provision of public goods [Bergstrom et al., 1986].3 User-contributed content
on the Internet exhibits some interesting features, however. For example, most
prior examples involved monetary donations (e.g., public radio fundraising),
not raw material or finished production (information content). Likewise, prior
examples were typically produced or managed by a non-profit or government
agency; much donated Internet content is given to for-profit firms. Further,
when the donation is content rather than money, quality is a crucial concern.
In fact, Tom Sawyer’s example is quite apt: in-kind donations to a private
producer, with a significant concern for quality.
In this chapter we review what economists — and to some extent, social
psychologists — have to say about solving two fundamental problems facing
a for-profit or not-for-profit firm that wants to rely on UCC: how to motivate
contributors to get (good) stuff in, and motivate miscreants to keep bad stuff out.
Getting stuff in: why would volunteers be motivated to contribute information
1Other common names for this phenomenon are user-generated content, consumer-
generated media, and user-created content.
2 They even paid him for the privilege of providing volunteer labor: “an apple, a dead rat
on a string, part of a jews-harp, a piece of blue bottle-glass to look through, a spool cannon,
a key that wouldn’t unlock anything, a fragment of chalk, a glass stopper of a decanter, a tin
soldier, a couple of tadpoles, six fire-crackers, a kitten with only one eye, a brass door-knob,
a dog-collar – but no dog – the handle of a knife, four pieces of orange-peel, and a dilapidated
old window sash” [Twain, 1876, pp. 32–33].
3We focus on the private provision of public goods, rather than philanthropy in general,
because information resources typically are public goods: they are non-rivalrous, or the use of
the resource by one person does not reduce the ability of any other person to use the resource
[Samuelson, 1954].
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content? Why spend time proofreading and correcting Wikipedia articles? Fur-
ther, for many if not most information resources, the quality and variety of
contributions is crucial for the social value of the resource. Thus, the problem is
not just getting people to contribute, but getting the right people to contribute,
or getting the people who contribute to devote effort to providing desirable
quality or variety. Keeping bad stuff out: user-contributed content systems are,
generally, open-access publishing platforms. They provide an opportunity for
users to contribute content that is in the interest of the contributor, but outside
the scope, and possibly harmful to the information service. Spam is a primary
example: it shows up in blog comments, book reviews, encyclopedia articles,
comments on photos, announcements to Facebook users, and so on. Manipula-
tion is another example of bad stuff: self-interested users trying to manipulate
outcomes of, say, rating and recommendation systems to favor attention to (and
often sales of) their books, movies, music, and other self-interests. These are
the problems we address in sections 4 – 6.
We begin with a brief survey of various types of UCC:
Information sharing systems There are many online knowledge, experi-
ence, and media sharing systems, e.g., Usenet, forums, weblogs, Amazon book
reviews, Yahoo!Answers, YouTube, Flickr. In such systems, there is no specific
goal beyond the collection and sharing of the information itself. Little struc-
ture is imposed on users’ contributions, although their formats or type may
vary. For example, while most forums use threads to organize conversations,
question-answer systems such as Yahoo!Answers specify a question-answer for-
mat which limits the extent of discussions. Some systems only facilitate posting
text, i.e., forums and Usenet; others allow images, video, or audio, e.g., Flickr,
YouTube, and blogs.
Open, coordinated creation Some UCC systems have clear goals, which in
turn break down into tasks for individual contributors. For example, Wikipedia
was founded to produce an online free encyclopedia, which requires contributors
willing and able to create, write, style, edit, and proofread individual entries. An
open source software project usually breaks down to smaller modules written
by different programmers. This division of labor makes coordination among
contributors necessary, leading to the creation of policies, guidelines, or licenses.
For example, Wikipedia has established a number of policies to regulate the
nature of the content produced, such as neutral point of view, and no original
research.4
Rating systems People often care about the relative quality of a product
or service. Online rating systems aggregate and publish ratings contributed
by volunteers. Rating systems work well for products or services for which
consumers have similar tastes (they agree on what is high or low quality, albeit
with various intensities). For example, most items listed on Amazon have a
4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:List of policies, retrieved on Mar 29, 2008.
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rating that indicates quality. LawyerRatingz.com allows users to rate their
lawyers.
Recommender systems People’s tastes may differ sufficiently for certain
products or services, such that they cannot agree on a particular ranking of
these products or services. For example, some care only for romantic comedies,
while others strongly prefer horror films. In these cases, the ideal ratings need to
be individually customized. A recommender system recommends items to best
suit an individual’s tastes, while relying on a dataset of opinions contributed
by users. Typical recommendation systems employ some form of collabora-
tive filtering: a technology that automatically predicts the preference of a user
based on many others’ tastes.5 Two standard types of collaborative filtering
techniques are person-to-person and item-to-item recommendations. Person-to-
person recommender systems use users’ past evaluations of items to identify
pairs of people with similar tastes. The system then recommends to users items
liked by others with similar tastes. There are many variations of this method
(see, e.g., Breese et al. [1998]). An item-to-item recommender system relies on
a similarity measure between pairs of items, instead of pairs of people [Lin-
den et al., 2003]. When a user shows interest in an item, a set of items with
high-similarity scores are recommended to her. NetFlix — a movie rental and
recommendation site — uses an algorithm of this type [Bennet, 2006].
Social tagging systems Search and retrieval from many online resources,
such as bookmarks, images, and videos, makes use of metadata (information
about information, such as keywords, creation date, or creator identity). To a
certain extent, metadata can be generated automatically using computer algo-
rithms, such as by parsing an image’s file name. However, machine semantic
comprehension is limited, and information contributors often do not provide
useful data from which to infer metadata (e.g., “img003.jpg” as a file name).
As a result, metadata are generated, for the most part, by expensive humans.
Another problem is that the person constructing a query has to guess what
terms and concepts the metadata providers have associated to the object. This
is hard: inter-user agreement on unrestricted labels applied to describe an in-
formation object tends to be only about 20 percent [Furnas et al., 1987, Rader
and Wash, 2006].
Social tagging is a UCC approach to these problems. By this we mean
resources that consist of user-contributed metadata; the content to which the
metadata refer may or may not be UCC. Social tagging systems enable multiple
volunteers to label objects in their own words, and to share these labels. The
advantages of human over automated labeling are retained, while volunteer la-
bor reduces the cost and the vocabulary matching problem may be reduced by
5Recommender system can also be built without collaborative filtering technology. For
example, Pandora Radio (http://pandora.com) generate recommendations based on a prior
manual analysis of the music files. Since we focus on user-contributed content, this type of
recommender system is outside of our scope.
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aggregating the labels applied by many users. Successful social tagging systems
include del.icio.us (for web bookmarks), Flickr.com (for pictures), CiteULike
and Connotea (for scientific references), YouTube (for videos), the Google im-
age labeling system (based on the ESP game, espgame.org), and Technorati
(for blog posts). These systems differ in a number of implementation features
[Marlow et al., 2006].
2. WHAT IS INCENTIVE-CENTERED DESIGN?
The challenges facing UCC systems — getting good stuff in and keeping bad
stuff out — are the result of behavioral choices. Though people are autonomous,
their choices are often influenced, if not fully determined, by their preferences
and the configuration of motivators they face. Of course choices need not be
fully consistent with axioms of rationality, as we typically assume in economic
theory models. As long as there is some systematic and predictable tendency in
behavior responses to motivators, system designers can provide or manage in-
centives to induce more, and more valuable, participation. We call this approach
incentive-centered design (ICD).
Our approach to incentive-centered design relies heavily on the economics
literature, where it usually is called “mechanism design”; see, e.g., [Laffont and
Martimort, 2002] for an introduction. However, the economics literature tends
to focus somewhat narrowly on either monetized or direct-revelation mecha-
nisms, and to assume full rationality. We have found that many incentive de-
sign ideas that relax this limitations can be found in the social psychology and
other literatures, which do not use the term “mechanism design.” Further,
most UCC-specific design work to date, both in practice and in the scholarly
literature, comes from noneconomists. Therefore, we adopt the more inclusive
“incentive-centered design.”
The scope for incentive-centered design is large. For example, designing con-
straints to limit or shape human behaviors (sometimes called “affordances” in
the design theory literature) is usually a matter of creating incentives. A law
prohibiting certain behavior, for example, can be seen as the imposition of some
sort of cost (fine, jail time, social approbation) on a particular behavior, provid-
ing a disincentive to choosing that behavior, but as we know, not always pre-
venting that behavior. A technological barrier, such as a password, can also be
thought of as a (dis)incentive design: for example, password-protected systems
are not impossible to enter unauthorized, but well-designed password schemes
make unauthorized entry quite costly (adding, perhaps, to the legal costs im-
posed on unauthorized trespass if one is caught and successfully prosecuted);
see, e.g., [Wash and MacKie-Mason, 2007, Herley, 2009]. In later sections 4 – 6,
we offer an overview of families of incentive-centered designs and what we know
about their usefulness in various UCC settings.
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3. WHY NOT MARKETS?
Before we elaborate on ICD methods for UCC, we briefly discuss a natural ques-
tion: why not markets? After all, we are talking about obtaining (information)
inputs to a production process, and the second fundamental theorem of welfare
economics asserts that any efficient allocation can be supported by a competi-
tive (market) equilibrium. More prosaically, the Encyclopedia Britannica and
New York Times pay writers: why don’t Wikipedia and Amazon?
Of course, there are times when market solutions can work for UCC prob-
lems. However, we find that the fundamental market failures we discuss in the
chapter are so pervasive for UCC that it is more useful to focus on non-market
incentive design methods.
There are two straightforward and fundamental reasons that market solu-
tions may not provide efficient outcomes for UCC systems: externalities and
asymmetric information. Consider first the problem of keeping the bad stuff
out: for example, preventing spammers (e.g., unsolicited advertisers) from mo-
nopolizing the content in a UCC resource. The problem, in part, is analogous
to pollution: in pursuing its own self-interest (advertising), the spammer gener-
ates detritus that reduces the utility of others. In addition, undesirable content
can be characterized as an asymmetric information problem of the hidden infor-
mation (or adverse selection) type: spammers know who they are ex ante, but
UCC system managers and content users do not know until after they bear the
cost of seeing and processing the spam. If we knew spammers’ type ex ante, we
simply would deny them permission to use the UCC platform.
The externality problem for getting good stuff in generally goes the other
way: contributed information often is a public good, and thus potential contrib-
utors benefit from the contributions of others, and have a strong incentive to
free ride. Asymmetric information is also a problem. For example, individuals’
willingness to contribute (say, due to altruism or social-regarding preferences)
generally is hidden information, as is their talent or differential ability to pro-
duce quality content. Creating high-quality content also requires effort, not
just talent, and that effort is often hard to monitor, leading to a hidden action
(moral hazard) problem of asymmetric information.
Of course, information content and processing effort are often obtained
through labor market solutions, even on the Internet. For example, MySpace
has an army of paid employees who review all user-posted photos, in order to
delete those that are inappropriate. The externalities are monetized (through
advertisers who pay for the free-riding visitors to the web pages) and the hidden
action problems have, apparently, been adequately resolved through standard
contracting and monitoring methods. So why do so many services rely on unpaid
volunteers?
We believe that another problem favors the use of volunteers over employees
in many UCC settings: transaction costs. Successful UCC systems might have
hundreds or thousands of contributors; in Wikipedia’s case, millions. These
volunteers are sometimes allowed to participate without transacting at all, pro-
5
viding anonymous contributions without even creating an account. In most
cases, there is only the minimal, automated transaction of creating an (often
pseudonymous) account. The producer avoids the costs of verifying identity
and immigration status; does not need to collect and report any employment
data to the tax and government pension authorities; need not keep time or
effort records, nor process and document payments; and so on. These transac-
tions costs generally are small enough when hiring full-time employees, and even
part-time employees who work 10 or more hours most weeks. However, in UCC
systems many volunteers might contribute only once, or quite infrequently, and
the transactions of contractually employing them would swamp their value.6
4. GETTING STUFF IN
A main reason that the problem of getting stuff in cannot be solved by markets
efficiently, is the externality in UCC participants’ contributions (see section 3).
Most UCC systems make their content publicly accessible: everybody can read
any Wikipedia article, browse any bookmarks on del.icio.us, and watch any
video on YouTube. These content exhibit characteristics of public goods: they
are nonrivalrous — user A’s consumption of the good does not diminish user
B’s. In general, such type of goods are under-provided if provided voluntarily
[Samuelson, 1954]. Why contribute if I could consume it for free? In UCC in
particular, the under-provision problem of public goods is especially pernicious
as the content provided usually only benefits others, not the provider himself.7
It would appear that individuals have little incentive to share their private
information or knowledge with others.
For the under-provision problem of public goods, economists have proposed
many theoretical solutions, mostly focused on settings in which consumers col-
lectively fund some public goods. Some of these solutions achieve the socially
efficient levels of provision [Groves and Ledyard, 1977, Walker, 1981, Bagnoli
and Lipman, 1989, Admati and Perry, 1991], and some improve on voluntary
contribution [Morgan, 2000]. These solutions offer valuable insights into what
economic mechanisms can achieve in a setting where side-payments are permis-
sible among the participants. However, in most UCC systems, side payments
are either not possible (e.g., due to transaction costs) or not desired by the
members of the system (e.g., due to social or psychological costs). It is unclear
how these classical mechanisms could be implemented in UCC systems that do
not support side payments.
These classical solutions also miss the novel opportunities offered by infor-
mation technology to motivate content contribution. In particular, information
6Mechanical Turk, at https://www.mturk.com/, is one attempt to create a low-transaction
marketplace for piece-rate online labor. Mechanical Turk was unveiled in 2005, but is still in
beta and currently offers only about 2000 different employment tasks on a typical day.
7That is, the contributor already has the information and the benefits of its use. Con-
tributing it to the public resource only provides additional benefits to the contributor if it is
enhanced or improved as a consequence.
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technology makes it relatively inexpensive to collect, process, aggregate, and
disseminate information. What these capabilities offer to the UCC systems is a
vast open area to be explored by both researchers and UCC system designers.
Here, we discuss a few areas in which information technology has shown its
promise.
First, technologies enable UCC systems to collect information generated
by their users in the process of enjoying the functionalities provided by the
site. Such information can then be aggregated and made public. For instance,
del.icio.us, a bookmark sharing website, provides its users with a personal online
repository for their bookmarks, along with certain valuable features, including
the convenience of accessing bookmarks from any networked computer, and a
tagging system for organizing them. Then, as individuals submit and annotate
bookmarks for their own information management purposes, del.icio.us auto-
matically aggregates these privately motivated contributions, and makes them
public by default8. At least in part, the publicly available bookmarks are a side
effect of the individual, private activities. In section 4.1 we discuss various ways
of motivating user contribution by offering them useful functionality.
Second, information technology allows UCC system designers to use exclu-
sion (“If you do not contribute, you do not get access”) to motivate contribu-
tion. Using exclusion as a motivating instrument effectively converts pure public
goods into impure (nonrivalrous but excludable) public goods. Exclusion is not
new: club goods — congestible public goods that are excludable, such as private
parks and swimming pools — are funded at least in part through their exclud-
ability. Information technology significantly enhances UCC systems’ ability to
monitor and evaluate individuals’ contributions. Based on each individual’s con-
tribution level, the system can dynamically customize her level of consumption.
For example, one peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing community, ilovetorrents.com,
uses a simple exclusion rule: it requires its members to maintain a minimum
upload/download ratio to be eligible for continued downloading.9 In section 4.2,
we review the literature on using exclusion to motivate contribution in the con-
text of UCC.
Last, by facilitating social interactions, information technology provides
UCC system designers yet another lever for motivating contribution: social
motivators (mechanisms that make use of incentives that are not traditionally
considered economic, but which have received attention in, e.g., social psychol-
ogy). People respond to a range of motivators such as their social identity, social
norms, and whether people are rewarded equally for their efforts. In section 4.3
we discuss studies that have used these insights to motivate contribution into
UCC systems.
8Users can opt-out of sharing their bookmarks, but they have to do it for each individual
bookmark.
9See http://www.ilovetorrents.com/rules.php, retrieved on Dec 11, 2008.
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4.1. Side-effect public goods
Some UCC systems offer useful functionalities to their users from which they
privately benefit. These privately-beneficial functions might be provided in ex-
change for, or as a result of contributions. Then, with user permission (either
opt-in or opt-out), the contributions can be aggregated and provided to the
public. We characterize these as side-effect public goods systems, and iden-
tify four categories of functionalities that we have seen in use to motivate user
contributions.
First, providing directly consumable products offers robust incentives for
user contribution. We have mentioned Del.icio.us, which offers its users a per-
sonal bookmark management system, as well as a well-tagged public repository
of bookmarks as a spill-over [Wash and Rader, 2007]. Similarly, movie recom-
mender systems offer their users personalized movie recommendations. A user
rates movies in order to receive good recommendations for herself. In the mean
time, her ratings benefit other users as the recommending algorithm takes her
input into account while generating recommendations for other users. Indeed,
users on MovieLens10, a movie recommendation website, self-reported that a
main motivation for them to rate movies was to improve the quality of their
own movie recommendations [Harper et al., 2005]. In these settings, users may
not realize, nor care that they are contributing to a public good. Even if they do
care, the distinct private benefits they receive may be necessary (and perhaps
sufficient) to motivate their contributions.
Second, many users find participating in UCC systems intrinsically enjoy-
able. Both fun and ideological reasons attract contributors to Wikipedia, but
it is fun that causes a high level of contributions [Nov, 2007]. MovieLens users
rate movies for fun as well [Harper et al., 2005]. von Ahn and Dabbish [2004]
created a game in which pairs of players try to guess each other’s choice of
tags to the same images. While tagging images is a boring task, this matching
game makes it entertaining. Each player consumes her entertainment, and at
the same time contributes metadata, i.e., tags, to those images. These tags
are valuable metadata for performing online image searches, or tuning image
recognition algorithms. Google uses this system as the Google Image Labeler
with a goal of tagging all publicly accessible images on the Web to make them
more findable by searchers.11
Third, sometimes contributing to UCC systems is an opportunity to learn
valuable skills. For example, learning programming in a team environment
employing industry standard group engineering tools is an important reason for
open source programmers to participate in the projects [Raymond, 1999, Hars,
2002, Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003].
Last, UCC systems offer a good place for people to receive feedback, or
establish a reputation for their ability. The contributions themselves, and feed-
back on them evidence an individual’s ability, which might lead to future career
opportunities [Lerner and Tirole, 2002]. Feedback may also have a warm-glow
10See http://movielens.umn.edu, retrieved on Sept 21, 2010.
11See http://images.google.com/imagelabeler/, retrieved on Oct 26, 2010.
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effect, making the receiver feel that she has “done her bit” [Andreoni, 1995].
Sometimes feedback is in and of itself rewarding: people want to know how
competent they are compared to others [Ryan and Deci, 2000].
4.2. Exclusion-based mechanisms
Using exclusion to motivate contribution is not a new idea. Clubs solve the
getting-stuff-in problem by charging membership and/or use fees, and excluding
those who do not pay.12 Clubs for sharing excludable public goods have been
studied and are often modeled as cost-sharing games [Moulin, 1994, Deb and
Razzolini, 1999, Young, 1998, Bag and Winter, 1999, Moldovanu, 1996, Dearden,
1997]. We rule out monetary payments in the definition of UCC, but this does
not mean that excludability is unhelpful. Consider barter, as in a babysitting
co-op: parents are motivated to donate their time to babysit for others because
they get access to an in-kind good (“free” babysitting for their children). In
other words, some form of exchange may be available to motivate provision,
but for UCC systems we limit our consideration to non-monetary exclusion
mechanisms.
The advancement of information technology makes it easy to exclude any
individual based on her contribution level, at any time. For networked com-
putational information systems, access control is relatively cheap, with varying
degrees of identification possible using passwords, Internet Protocol (IP) ad-
dresses, or cookies. Some metrics on contributions can be automatically moni-
tored (such as number by contributor, and total bytes), creating the possibility
of algorithmic exclusion based on contribution. Contribution quality can be
evaluated and quantified either by human raters, or algorithmically in some
cases. Examples of human ratings include user ratings of book reviews on Ama-
zon, of answers on Yahoo!Answers, and of comments posted on Slashdot.org.
As an algorithmic example, the value of each edit on Wikipedia can now be
measured by how long it survives subsequent deletions or modifications [Adler
and de Alfaro, 2007].
Although information technology offers some opportunities for using exclusion-
based mechanisms to motivate content contribution, systematic exploration of
exclusion-based mechanisms is yet to begin. A natural starting point is to adapt
the mechanisms proposed in the cost-sharing literature [Moulin, 1994, Deb and
Razzolini, 1999, Young, 1998, Bag and Winter, 1999, Moldovanu, 1996, Dearden,
1997] to the context of UCC. Such adaptation is not straightforward. First of
all, the cost-sharing mechanisms were proposed to motivate monetary contribu-
tion, but a UCC system designer needs to elicit contribution in the form of time
and effort (see section 5 for a detailed discussion on this difference). Second,
12We do not delve into the large body of literature on club goods (see Sandler and Tschirhart
[1980], Wildasin [1986], Starrett [1988], and Scotchmer [2008] for reviews of the literature),
as most of these studies treat club goods as impure public goods. Thus the goods are to a
certain extent rivalrous. Barring special cases under which a member of a UCC system might
derive negative utility from an additional member (e.g., a large user population reduces one’s
sense of community), we treat the content on UCC as non-rivalrous goods.
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even if we set aside the issues implied by the difference between monetary and
non-monetary contribution, it might still be hard to implement the cost-sharing
mechanisms in UCC systems, due to various reasons. For example, Dearden
[1997] and Deb and Razzolini [1999] propose mechanisms to share the cost of
an indivisible public good (e.g., a new bridge), assuming each participant knows
her private valuation a priori, regardless of others’ valuation. In UCC systems,
however, the amount of the public good produced is not known in advance. The
goals of an effective mechanism are to determine both how much content to pro-
duce and how much each individual contributes. Other mechanisms, e.g., the
serial cost sharing mechanism [Moulin, 1994] and the subscription based mech-
anism Bag and Winter [1999], require complex communication or coordination
among the participants, which is not feasible for many UCC systems with a
large number of participants.
In practice, however, simple and effective exclusion-based non-monetary
mechanisms have been used in popular UCC applications. Some peer-to-peer
(P2P) file sharing communities, e.g., ilovetorrents.com, use a simple exclusion
rule: it requires its members to maintain a minimum upload/download ratio
to be eligible for continuing to download files.13 As another example, Glass-
door.com provides free information on salaries of a wide range of professionals,
if you sign up and report your own salary.
Although these simple mechanisms may not always be Pareto efficient or
incentive compatible, the fact that they are used in practice indicates that it
is useful to examine their properties in a systematic manner.14 A number of
human-subject laboratory experiments have been conducted to investigate these
mechanisms, under the assumption that individuals have homogeneous prefer-
ences. For example, Croson et al. [2008] found that simply excluding the person
with the lowest level of contribution can be sufficient to motivate high levels of
contribution. Swope [2002] found the minimum threshold mechanism (MTM)
— one only gets to access the full content if her contribution level is above a
pre-specified threshold — can in some situations achieve full cooperation, given
that the gain from a fully coordinated cooperation is sufficiently high. When
the gain from full cooperation is relatively low, though still higher than no co-
operation, people have trouble coordinating on the full cooperation equilibrium.
Alternatively, instead of specifying a threshold exogenously, Kocher et al. [2005]
let the subjects themselves determine the threshold, and found that such an
endogenously determined threshold also helps reducing free-riding, and that the
time at which the announcement of the threshold is made affects the outcome.
Two recent analytical studies consider the performance of an MTM and a
ratio mechanism when individuals have heterogeneous preferences. The ratio
13See http://www.ilovetorrents.com/rules.php, retrieved on Oct 13, 2010.
14As a reminder: “incentive compatibility” in the economics mechanism design literature
refers to a direct revelation mechanism in which it is rational for a participant to reveal his
or her private information truthfully. Incentive compatibility is often imposed as a constraint
in theoretical derivations of optimal mechanisms, because the revelation principle assures us
that we lose no generality by restricting consideration to incentive-compatible direct revelation
mechanisms. However, incentive-compatibility may not be per se desirable, and in practice
many, perhaps most, revelation mechanisms are in fact not incentive compatible.
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mechanism permits a participant to consume no more than an amount that is
a fixed proportion to her own contribution. Assuming that all the individuals
can be ordered by their marginal net utility of the public goods, Wash and
MacKie-Mason [2008] show that MTM can improve the efficiency compared to
a voluntary contribution mechanism. Assuming individuals have homogeneous
cost functions but heterogenous valuation of the public goods, Jian [2010] found
that MTM has some advantages over the ratio mechanism.
In summary, although some mechanisms to motivate contribution to exclud-
able public goods have been studied before, their applicability to UCC systems
needs systematic examination. Meanwhile, new mechanisms emerge in the field.
Further research is required to understand the properties of these new mecha-
nisms, to enable systematic empirical comparisons and to derive generalizable
design recommendations.
4.3. Social motivators
People derive happiness not only from consumption-related activities, e.g., en-
joying a movie, but also from non-consumption related activities, e.g., being
altruist (see [Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003], for a review) or helping society achiev-
ing fairness [Knoch et al., 2006]. Thus, in the context of UCC, users might care
intrinsically about how much they themselves contribute (independent of any
extrinsic motivators provided for contribution), and not just how much they con-
sume. Here we introduce a few, non-exhaustive, examples of ways to motivate
contribution, drawing on both economics and social psychology literature.
Collective effort model Karau and Williams [1993] developed the collective
effort model (CEM) to explain individual effort in performing collective tasks,
and used this model to identify factors that help reducing social loafing, or
free-riding. Examples of CEM’s predictions are that individuals work harder
when they believe their own contributions lead to identifiable values in the
aggregated outcome, when they work in relatively small groups, when they like
their teammates or identify with the group, or when they consider the group
tasks meaningful.
A number of CEM predictions were recently tested in a UCC system, Movie-
Lens. On MovieLens users rate movies, receive movie recommendations from
others with similar tastes to themselves, and participate in discussions. Hav-
ing a sufficient number of movie ratings is essential for the recommendation
algorithm to produce accurate predictions for its users. In fact, more than 20
percent of the movies do not have enough ratings to make predictions about
them to the users. The system designers would also like to encourage people
to post messages to the discussion forums, in order to make the site more so-
cial. The researchers [Ling et al., 2005] decided to use insights suggested by the
CEM to motivate movie rating contributions. One particular treatment they
implemented was based on the insight that people work harder if they think
their contributions are unique. They divided the subjects into a treatment and
a control group. The participants in the uniqueness treatment group received
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weekly email messages to remind them how unique their movie ratings are,
and to invite them to participate in an online discussion. The non-uniqueness
control group only received an invitation to an online discussion. They found
supporting evidence for the uniqueness hypothesis: people who were reminded
of the uniqueness of their contributions rated more movies and posted more
often in the discussion forums.
The CEM also predicts that people are more likely to perform a task for
their group if they know the value of doing so. This prediction is confirmed by
another field experiment conducted on the MovieLens community. Rashid et al.
[2006] showed each user a list of movies each with smilies indicating how much
value she would have contributed to the community if she rated this movie.15
They found that users were more likely to rate a movie if there were smilies
indicating the potential value of rating this movie.
Social identity The premise of the social identity theory is that a person
derives an identity of self (social identity) from his or her membership in social
groups, such as being a woman, or a caucasian [Tajfel and Turner, 1979]. One
predicted effect of social identity is that it creates in-group favoritism: people
make choices that favor their in-group members and have higher opinions of their
in-group members than those out-group. These predictions are supported by a
large number of experimental studies in social psychology [see, e.g., the following
literature surveys: Tajfel and Turner, 1986, Deaux, 1996, Hogg, 2003, McDer-
mott, 2009]. Building on the existing literature, Ren et al. [2007] predict that in
online communities on which many UCC systems rely, in-group favoritism may
take the following forms: group cohesion and commitment, more focused con-
versations than off-topic chat, increased levels of contribution to public goods
and less social loafing, conforming to group norms, welcoming new members,
and engaging in generalized reciprocity (when one’s giving is reciprocated by a
third party not the receiver). A group with a strong identity may also attract
new members to join and contribute to the group’s goal. For example, Bryant
et al. [2005] and Nov [2007] both document that Wikipedia attracts new ed-
itors due to people’s belief in its goal of producing a useful online knowledge
repository.
There are multiple ways to induce social identity in an online setting [Ren
et al., 2007]. One can categorize people into groups based on their existing
social categories, such as organizational membership, ethnicity, or their politi-
cal values. One can also simply assign people into arbitrary groups [Tajfel and
Turner, 1986, Postmes et al., 2002, Worchel et al., 1998]. In addition, group
identity can be induced by emphasizing in-group homogeneity, such as that
all members share a joint task [Worchel et al., 1998, Cartwright and Zander,
1968, Sherif et al., 1961], a common purpose [Postmes et al., 2001], or a com-
mon fate [Michinov et al., 2004]. Group identity can also be made salient by
doing inter-group comparisons, and emphasizing the differences from the out-
15The value of the ratings are calculated using algorithms that take into account the simi-
larity of this movie to other movies in the database. See [Rashid et al., 2006] for details.
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groups [Postmes et al., 2001, Rogers and Lea, 2005, Worchel et al., 1998]. For
example, Wikipedia editors frequently compare their product to Encyclopedia
Britannica16, and open source software project (e.g., Linux) developers often
compare their product against commercial proprietary products (e.g., Microsoft
Windows).
Using social identity theory to motivate contributions is an active research
area. Researchers have made progress in incorporating social identity into eco-
nomic theories [for example, Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2002, 2005, Benabou
and Tirole, forthcoming], and in measuring and quantifying the effects of social
identity on people’s social preferences (how much people care about others’ earn-
ings) [Chen and Li, 2009]. Towards the implementation of social identity theory
in UCC systems, open questions remain. For example, Ren et al. [2007] pro-
posed many design principles for fostering group identity in online communities,
such as encouraging newcomers to observe the group norm before contributing
content, and restricting off-topic discussions among contributors. The effective-
ness of these proposals need to be put to test, especially by field experiments,
before precise design suggestions can be made to practitioners.
Social comparison, norms, and social preference Cyber-infrastructure
facilitates collecting, aggregating, and disseminating social information in real
time. Information about what others do can affect individuals’ behavior in a
number of ways. Comparison with superior others may trigger self-improvement
motives [see Wood, 1989, for a review]. People have the tendency to conform
to social norms [see Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004, for a review]. People may
also fundamentally care about other people’s welfare, for example exhibiting
inequality aversion: people do not like to earn different amounts from others
and would like to reduce the difference if they can [Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000,
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999]. Some people even try to maximize social welfare, just
like a social planner [Charness and Rabin, 2002].
In light of the predictions of these theories, UCC system designers can strate-
gically deliver information about what other participants do to UCC users in
order to induce increased contributions. In fact, some UCC systems are al-
ready using social information to motivate contribution. For example, leader
boards for Yahoo!Answers and Amazon book reviews are presumably intended
to motivate some users to aspire to contribute as much or more than the leaders.
There have been a few empirical studies on using social information to moti-
vate contribution to UCC systems. For example, while discussing the collective
effort model we mentioned MovieLens, a site that relies on user-contributed
ratings to make personalized movie recommendations. In this system under-
contribution is common. Based on insights from the social comparison theory,
Chen et al. [forthcoming] designed a field experiment to test the use of social
information on MovieLens contributions. After receiving information about the
median user’s total number of movie ratings, users below the median exhibit a
530 percent increase in the number of monthly movie ratings, while those above
16See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reliability_of_Wikipedia.
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the median do not necessarily decrease their ratings.
5. CONTRIBUTION QUALITY
When designing for content contributions, the variable quality of information
content is an unavoidable issue. A large literature on public goods contribution
focuses on monetary donations; this literature can ignore quality because money
is homogeneous [Andreoni, 2006]. But information is not: however its quantity
is measured, its value per unit will vary across users, or across units of content,
or both. Some content may even have negative value (to at least some users)
because it offends or psychologically harms (some would say obscenity falls in
this category), or because the clutter it causes — and corresponding increase
in search or filtering costs — outweigh the value to the recipient (spam email
is an obvious example). We address negative-valued content (“bad stuff”) in
section 6. In this section we address variations in the quality of contributions
with non-negative value.
The differences between contributed content and contributed money — “crowd-
sourcing” versus “crowd-funding”— are fundamental. First, monetary contribu-
tions from different individuals are substitutable and additive. Content quality
is heterogeneous, however, and so contributions are not always substitutable;
when they are, the marginal rate of substitution may vary across users or across
different units of content (two different articles on user-contributed content will
not be equally good substitutes for this chapter). Second, if content of varying
quality is not treated the same (e.g., if incentives are created to induce provi-
sion of desirable quality mixes), then the cost of evaluating quality must also
be considered in system design. The fundamental differences between content
and monetary contributions require fundamentally different solutions.
The quality of user-contributed content generally must be characterized in
multiple dimensions. Economists have long partitioned the space into two sets
of quality dimensions: “vertical” and “horizontal.” A vertical quality charac-
teristic is one about which (essentially) all agents agree on a rank ordering (a
Porsche is better than a Pinto) [e.g., Mussa and Rosen, 1978]. A horizontal
quality characteristic is a feature over which agents have heterogeneous pref-
erences (“Alice likes red cars; Bob likes blue”) [e.g., Lancaster, 1966]. UCC
system designers can, and often do, enable and encourage the provision of mul-
tiple levels of vertical quality, and varieties of horizontal quality. For example,
Slashdot.org asks readers to evaluate comments posted by other users on a nu-
meric (vertical) scale, and also to designate various adjectives that horizontally
characterize the comment (such as informative, funny, insightful, and off topic).
A photo uploaded to Flickr has numerous attributes (that users may or may
not provide) including the photo groups in which it is included, tags assigned
to it, and the geographic location at which the photo was taken. At Amazon,
readers are encouraged to contribute ratings of products: these are subjective
and clearly horizontal (or a mix of horizontal and vertical); Amazon then makes
public an aggregate evaluation score (that is, a vertical numeric indicator be-
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tween zero and five), as well as the heterogeneous ratings by individuals (and
their even more heterogeneous written comments).
Depending on the particular type of content that a UCC system designer
aims at producing, she will have preferences over the mix of horizontal and
vertical quality. She then designs mechanisms to motivate the users to create
content that provide desirable quality characteristics (taking into account the
cost of inducing those qualities). Next we discuss mechanisms that can, in
general, be employed to obtain various mixes of horizontal and vertical quality,
though we can expect that different mechanisms will work better or worse for
different desired quality mixes, and in different contexts. There is very little
empirical literature to date on the effectiveness of these mechanisms for eliciting
desired contributed-content quality.
To elicit content with her desired mix of vertical and horizontal quality
characteristics, a UCC system designer must address two incentives problems:
hidden information (also known as adverse selection), and hidden action (also
known as moral hazard). The first concerns heterogeneity across users. UCC
contributors vary in their abilities and the UCC system designers usually have
little information about individual contributor abilities. The abilities (often
referred to in the economics literature as “types”) are thus private, or hidden,
information. The system designer needs mechanisms to elicit more contributions
from users with desirable types, and less (or none) from those with undesirable
types. The second problem — hidden action — concerns variability in a given
contributor’s effort to produce desirable quality characteristics. Whatever a
contributor’s abilities, it is generally the case that he can produce more desirable
quality with more effort. But the amount of effort invested by a contributing
user is generally unobservable (or at least, unverifiable). The problem of hidden
action is to motivate a desirable level of effort.
In the following three subsections, we discuss three commonly used mecha-
nisms: moderation, rewards, and reputation, while keeping in mind how they
each address the hidden information and/or hidden action problems.
5.1. Metadata
Metadata, or information about information, can be a vehicle carrying an intrin-
sic incentive payload in various applications. The nature of the user-contributed
content application will determine which types of metadata mechanisms are
most useful. For example, ratings are a type of metadata most directly suited
for vertical quality dimensions; recommender systems tend to be designed for
horizontal quality dimensions (“people who liked John Irving’s most recent novel
often also like works by Nicholas DelBanco”).17 18
17Of course, both might be used in either setting, and more generally, combinations of them
might be used. For example, Netflix collects (vertical) ratings from movie viewers, but then
uses a collaborative filtering technique to summarize the ratings of “viewers who like what
you like” in order to provide recommendation to potential viewers.
18Not all metadata have an obvious use for the provision of intrinsic motivation. For ex-
ample, Library of Congress classification numbers for books are valuable metadata, but it is
15
In many UCC systems the process by which ratings are assigned to user post-
ings is called moderation. Moderators can be designated community members.
For instance, the Encyclopedia of Life (www.eol.org) assigns a curator for each
of its pages [Encyclopedia of Life, 2010]. Peer-moderation, sometimes by ran-
domly selected peers, is also popular. For example, Plastic.com and Slashdot.org
both invite randomly selected users to moderate others’ postings. Slashdot ad-
ditionally employs a meta-moderation mechanism: a meta-moderator checks a
moderator’s ratings.
An immediate use of a moderation system is filtering. The system, or individ-
ual users, can choose to filter out low-rated content. Further, to the extent that
content contributors value their readership, filtering based on moderation can
induce contributors to make increased effort to provide higher-quality content.
Using game-theoretic analysis, Chen et al. [2007] show that when the probabil-
ity of one’s post being moderated is high enough, an opportunistic contributor
who tries to maximize his/her readership and minimize efforts will exert high
effort. When this probability of moderation decreases, an opportunistic con-
tributor either uses a mixed strategy of exerting high and low effort, or always
exerts low effort.
A moderation system might be designed to elicit hidden information. MacKie-
Mason [2010] models a system in which content contributors post a bond which
is revoked if user ratings do not exceed a fixed threshold. He shows that such a
system can satisfy the conditions for a screening mechanism with a separating
equilibrium (contributors of poor content self-select out, and do not contribute).
The key conditions, as usual for screening mechanism, are that the cost of con-
tributing be higher for the low type, and that the cost be increasing faster for
the low type (the Spence-Mirrlees condition).
Of course, a peer-moderation system relies on UCC, itself. Thus its success
depends on solving the same problems of contribution quantity and quality,
this time from the peer moderators. Do the moderators do their job when
they are given the chance? By analyzing Slashdot’s server log data, Lampe
and Resnick [2004] found that its moderation system works fairly well: many
users moderate and/or meta-moderate posted comments. Another question we
might ask of a vertical ranking system, which is one of Slashdot’s mechanisms,
is whether moderator opinions about particular posts converge, as what we
expect with vertically-distributed consumer tastes? Lampe and Resnick found
that moderators do reach consensus: 92 percent of all meta-moderations show
agreement with the evaluated moderation, suggesting that readers’ tastes are
close to vertically distributed (in the “overall quality” dimension applied to
Slashdot articles), and that Slashdot’s use of a vertical ranking mechanism may
be effective.
hard to imagine that they have much effect on the motivation of writers. In this section we
are interested in metadata that at least in part provides motivation. Metadata used for other
purposes (such as finding and selecting information resources, e.g., search keywords and tags
at dmoz.org, citeulike.org, and del.icio.us) may be generated as user-contributed con-
tent, through systems with their own incentives problems to manage; many of our examples
in earlier sections were user-contributed metadata.
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5.2. Rewards
For some content contributors, the act itself of contributing is rewarding, be it
psychologically, socially, or even career-wise, as we discussed in section 4. For
others, explicit rewards might help motivating them to exert higher effort.
For example, Wikipedia puts up its “featured articles” on its front page, as
a way to showcase its best work. These articles are nominated and selected via
voting among peer Wikipedia editors. When an article is featured, it remains in
the “Today’s featured article” section on the front page for a day. In addition,
a golden star appears on the top of the article’s page thereafter to indicate
its “featured” status. Although articles on Wikipedia are usually products of
collaborative work by multiple editors, some major contributors take ownership.
For example, many editors put links to the articles they worked on onto their
personal Wikipedia user pages [Bryant et al., 2005]. Bryant et al. quote from
an interview of an editor to illustrate how the potential of having their articles
featured motivates editors to make high efforts:
Recently I’ve been working on the article . . . as a featured article
candidate. If my article is accepted as a featured article, it will
appear on the main page with a multi-paragraph excerpt and photo.
Featured articles stay on the front page for a day, and then they’re
swapped for another, so I’m really just trying for bragging rights
with this one.
Many explicit rewards for high-quality contributions in UCC systems are
in the form of “bragging rights.” However, some use direct financial reward.
YouTube (youtube.com) invites heavily-followed content contributors to share
the (advertisting) profits generated by their videos. For the successful few,
income from YouTube is sufficient for making a living [Stelter, 2008].
YouTube relies on its managers to hand pick individuals (called “partners”)
whose video postings qualify for profit sharing. This partner-selection process
could be automated. If the value of a piece of content will be revealed shortly
after its creation, automatic profit-sharing could be directly based on the value
of the content that a user has created [Bhattacharjee and Goel, 2007]. In the
event that the value of a piece content would not be revealed in the near fu-
ture, alternative evaluation methods are required. In the context of rewarding
honest reporting of ratings, e.g, ratings for movies, music, or academic articles,
Miller et al. [2005] propose to reward a user’s agreement with other users: if
a user’s rating agrees with others’, there is a higher chance that she is right.
Miller et al. show that, under some general conditions, the Nash equilibrium
of this mechanism is for every rater to report truthfully. Of course, successful
implementation of this proposed mechanism requires that certain assumptions
be maintained, including in this case that users are not able to manipulate the
system.
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5.3. Reputation
Reputation systems can solve the problem of hidden contributor ability infor-
mation (contributors know their own abilities, but the UCC system designer
does not). The essence of a successful reputation system is that it satisfies a
set of sufficient conditions for a signaling mechanism with a separating equilib-
rium: that the cost of obtaining reputation satisfies the single crossing property
[Spence, 1973, Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976]. That is, low-ability users’ cost of
attaining reputation has to be higher than that of high-ability users’.
A reputation system can also be used to address the moral hazard prob-
lem, that is, to motivate contributors to exert desirable levels of (hidden) effort.
Consider a typical system that accumulates a reputation score for participants:
the score, in general, increases with the amount of effort a user puts in, thus
providing an observable factor correlated with the unobservable effort. If the
observable — reputation score — is desirable, or can be made so, then con-
tributors can be motivated to exert more desirable effort. When the value of
higher-quality contributions can be monetized by the UCC system, contribu-
tors can be offered monetary awards correlated with their reputation score.19
Of course, a high reputation score itself might be desirable. For example, re-
search documents that humans have basic psychological needs to feel competent
[Ryan and Deci, 2000].
A reputation score can be generated by aggregating the ratings that an
individual has received in the past. For example, Wikipedia editors gave each
other barnstars — placing an image of a star on the receiver’s profile page,
usually with text explaining why the barnstar is given — to reward their “hard
work and due diligence” [Wikipedia, 2010b]. Ever since the barnstar system
was introduced in 2003, various kinds have been introduced to reward editors
performing all kinds of specific tasks. The “photographer’s barnstar” is to
reward editors who “tirelessly improve the Wikipedia with their photographic
skills.” And the “anti-vandalism barnstar” is to reward editors who “show great
contributions to protecting and reverting attacks of vandalism on Wikipedia.”
Besides aggregating explicit peer ratings, in some UCC systems, one can au-
tomatically generate reputation scores for the users based on implicit reactions
of their peers [Yang et al., 2008, Chen and Singh, 2001, Adler and de Alfaro,
2007]. For example, Adler and de Alfaro propose an algorithm to construct rep-
utation scores for Wikipedia editors based on the amount of their contribution
that survives other editors’ subsequent edits. That is, if one’s edits are of high
quality, others will also preserve them on Wikipedia instead of quickly deleting
them.
19Of course, monetary awards suffer from the problems we described in section 3, but one
we think is often the most severe — transaction costs — may be reduced if rewards are only
paid to high-scoring participants, and only after they have accumulated a substantial number
of contributions (rather than a micro-payment per contribution).
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6. KEEPING BAD STUFF OUT
In section 5 we focused a contributor who is motivated to provide positive
value to the UCC system, but due to variations in effort or capability may
provide higher or lower quality. A different type of contributor is motivated by
a goal distinct from the objectives of the UCC system, and thus may desire to
contribute negative quality (from the platform’s perspective).
There are many different types of negative-value content contributions. One
of the most familiar is email spam and its cousins. Another is writers using
pseudonyms to write great reviews for their own books on Amazon [e.g., Har-
mon, 2004]. Another is intentional manipulation, typically by exploiting infor-
mation processing algorithms on which a UCC system relies, such as a movie
distributor that might manipulate the ratings and recommendations made by
Netflix. Some content providers use UCC systems to distribute malware, such
as software carrying a disguised payload (trojan horse) that when installed on
a user’s machine creates a “bot” to collect and transmit personal (e.g., finan-
cial) information back to the perpetrator, or to take control of the computer’s
resources to participate in denial of service attacks, or as spam-forwarding mail
hosts. It is beyond our scope to offer a comprehensive discussion of all security
threats, of course.20 In this section we focus on threats that come in the form
of bad content, and some of the incentive-centered design approaches available
for keeping the bad stuff out.
6.1. Pollution: spam and negative externalities
A producer soliciting user-contributed content often tries to lower the costs of
contribution by offering a simple, easy access content collection system. Fur-
ther, in many applications, the producer will spend little or nothing on content
selection or editorial functions, instead making most contributed content avail-
able to consumers.21 For example, anyone can post a book or product review
to Amazon, and this content will appear to all users shortly thereafter [Ama-
zon.com, 2010]. Amazon is providing an open access publishing platform (albeit
with limited functionality), and some might want to publish information other
than book or product reviews. For example, a publisher might wish to post a
pseudonymous “book review” that is in fact just an advertisement for the pub-
lisher’s products. Email is another relatively open-access publishing platform,
and in that context we refer to unsolicited and unwanted advertising as spam.
The phenomenon is widespread, and has led people to coin terms for it in other
information product or service contexts, such as splog or blam (unsolicited ad-
vertisements in blog comments), spim (instant messaging), spamdexing (online
indices), sping (blog pings), m-spam (mobile phones), spit (voice-over-internet
telephony).
20See [MacKie-Mason, 2009] for on overview of the application of incentive-centered design
to security problems.
21But, see Section 5.1 for our discussion of the use of user-contributed metadata for filtering
and selecting.
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As mentioned earlier, this is a common problem for UCC because two condi-
tions often hold: some agents want to contribute content that has negative value
to the producer, and the producer offers an open publishing platform. When
these obtain, the producer faces a special instance of the quality management
problem: how to keep out content that has negative value. This is closely related
to the classic pollution or negative externality problem: some agent wants to
engage in an activity productive for itself (here, for example, advertising), but
in so doing imposes costs on others (here, the producer providing the publishing
platform) without bearing (internalizing) those costs.
For traditional pollution problems, the Coasian efficient bargaining solu-
tion generally fails due to undefined property rights and/or high transaction
costs [Coase, 1960]. Therefore, many mechanisms focus on these problems
[MacKie-Mason, 2000]. Property right ambiguity is not a central problem for
user-contributed content in most applications. Ownership of the producer’s
publishing platform is usually well-established. Likewise, the content supplier’s
copyright over content is usually clear enough; in any case, uncertainty about
the content creator’s copyright does not explain why production is organized to
rely on content inputs donated by volunteers.
Transaction, or bargaining costs, on the other hand, are often significant.
As we discussed earlier, a defining characteristic of production based on user-
contributed content is that there are many input suppliers, most of whom are
providing a small quantity of the producer’s inputs. Negotiating, contracting,
monitoring and transacting payments with hundreds or thousands of micro-
suppliers to internalize externalities they impose typically will be too costly
to support. We may need look no further than transaction cost economics to
understand why supplier contracting is not employed to reduce or eliminate
polluters.
Nonetheless, transaction costs are not the only, and perhaps not even the
most important problem for producers who want to limit user-contributed pol-
lution. With user-contributed content the pollution problem is complicated by
the coincident presence of the private provision of public goods problem (get-
ting stuff in, see Section 4). That is, the producer wants to encourage content
contributions, but simultaneously wants to discourage polluting contributions.
Mechanisms implemented to discourage pollution must be sufficiently discern-
ing that they do not overly discourage good contributors as well; conversely,
mechanisms to encourage good contributions must not too greatly encourage
polluting contributions.
Providing different incentives for different types of behavior is straightfor-
ward unless it is difficult to distinguish between the two types of behavior. But
this is precisely the problem with much user-contributed content: quality is not
costlessly observable, so there is an evaluation problem: how to distinguish good
from bad content at low cost, and before the pollution has imposed a cost on
the producer? Because information is an experience good, information pollu-
tion typically is accompanied by a hidden information problem: the polluter is
better informed ex ante about whether his content is polluting or desirable to
different classes of affected users. For example, Amazon has rules character-
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izing permissible content contributed in the form of product reviews and will
remove postings it discovers that violate these terms of use. But there have been
several documented (and surely a large number of undocumented) instances of
interested parties falsely posting “arm’s length reviews” to promote purchases
of their own, friends or clients’ products [Dellarocas, 2006, Harmon, 2004, Lea,
2010]. Evidently the cost of detecting this kind of misrepresentation is suffi-
ciently high that Amazon chooses not to spend the monitoring resources that
would be needed to keep all pollution of this sort from its site.
Thus, the incentive problem facing the designer of a UCC system that pro-
vides some open-access publishing capabilities is two-fold: induce contributors
to reveal whether they are contributing pollution (content of negative value),
and if identified, induce them to stop providing it. The latter problem is usually
the less challenging: once polluting content is identified, it is relatively inexpen-
sive in digital information systems to block it or purge it. Therefore, we focus
on incentives for the former: how do we induce contributors to reveal that their
contributions are polluting? Of course, sometimes the two problems collapse
into one: with some incentives, polluters may reveal themselves by the act of
not contributing.
6.1.1. Spam email
Many authors have proposed designs to reduce or better manage spam email.
These ideas provide a fertile example of the unavoidable necessity of address-
ing pollution as an incentives problem. Most of the ideas also apply, at least
qualitatively, to other types of UCC pollution.
The most familiar designs for combating spam email are usually presented
as technological, not incentive mechanisms. Such proposals include filtering
(rule-based, Bayesian, and community or “collaborative”), disposable identi-
ties using extended email addresses [Bleichenbacher et al., 1998], DomainKeys
Identified Mail [Perez, 2005], Sender ID or Sender Policy Framework [Crocker,
2006] 22, challenge-response [Dwork and Naor, 1993, Laurie and Clayton, 2004],
whitelists, and blacklists. See Cranor and LaMacchia [1998] for an overview of
many such ideas.
Although these systems generally do not involve extrinsic motivations (ex-
plicit exchanges of valuable resources), they fundamentally are incentive designs.
The polluters (spammers) are, at root, humans who are polluting in order to
achieve some objective (e.g., for many of them, advertising their products to
attract purchasers). There is a cost to sending spam; the spammers receive a
benefit. They will keep sending spam as long as the benefits exceed the costs.
The designs mentioned earlier are technological, but they work to the extent
that they raise the cost of spamming higher than the benefits: that is, they
are providing (dis)incentives by raising costs. For example, authenticated send-
ing mechanisms aim to raise cost by making it more difficult for spammers to
22As of now, spam-sending domains are ironically the biggest users of SPF tags [MXLogic,
2005]
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hide their identity (which for spam is often the central piece of hidden infor-
mation needed by the UCC system provider). Wash and MacKie-Mason [2007]
have demonstrated that challenge-response technologies are incentive mecha-
nisms (of the screening type). To succeed, all such technological mechanisms
must get the balance of incentives correct. In the formal literature, the main
sufficient conditions known for a screen to work (stated informally) are that
(a) the cost of passing the screen must be sufficiently higher for polluters than
for desirable participants, and (b) the rate at which the cost increases with
the quantity of contribution must be sufficiently higher for polluters than for
desirable participants (the Spence-Mirrlees condition).
Some recent work has addressed anti-spam design more directly as an in-
centive problem, suggesting both extrinsic and intrinsic motivators. An old and
familiar idea in this genre is imposing some form of e-mail stamp, or more gen-
erally, a fee on content contributors in a UCC setting [e.g., Kraut et al., 2005,
Hermalin and Katz, 2004]. Only contributors who value delivery sufficiently will
pay the fee; if undesirable contributors don’t value their contributions much,
they won’t contribute. This is a crude mechanism that will not work well if
there is substantial heterogeneity in the value contributors place on providing
their content, specifically if there is substantial (density-weighted) overlap in the
value distribution supports of the two types of contributors.23 When such pro-
posals have been made for email, the resulting outcry has focused on the many
low-wealth providers of desirable content (whether it be email from grandpar-
ents or from socially conscious nonprofit organizations), and the likelihood that
commercials advertisers (spammers) will be willing to pay the fee. Yahoo! and
AOL announced that they were going to introduce a type of stamp system
(provided by Goodmail) in 2005. This system is not mandatory for all senders:
rather, senders can elect to purchase a stamp. If they do, their email is guar-
anteed to pass through spam filters unscathed, and recipients see a certificate
of authenticity attached to the mail. As of May 2007, Goodmail claimed over
300 senders were paying for its stamps, but it appears that most of them are
commercial senders of unsolicited email: spammers [Goodmail, 2007].24
Loder et al. [2006] proposed a signaling device to reduce unwanted bulk
email advertising (spam), which they called an “attention bond mechanism.”
Email senders are required to post a revocable bond or their content will not
be delivered. Given a greater likelihood that a recipient will claim a spammer’s
bond, and appropriately selecting the size of the bond, the cost for a good sender
to signal its belief that the recipient wants to see its mail will be sufficiently lower
that they will be willing to comply and send email, whereas bad senders will be
discouraged.
Chiao and MacKie-Mason [2006] addressed the email spam pollution prob-
lem from a somewhat different perspective. They show conditions under which
23Hermalin and Katz [2004] also consider payments by recipients, and a mixed system with
payments by both senders and recipients.
24Goodmail markets its stamps to commercial senders who want to distinguish themselves as
“high quality” by virtue of having bought a stamp, in contrast to low quality, but nonetheless
some if not most of the mail they send using the stamps is unsolicited bulk commercial mail.
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offering an alternative, even lower-cost (and higher-quality) platform for adver-
tisers to distribute their spam might induce enough diversion of advertising to
the alternative channel, simultaneously lowering the value of the regular email
channel for other spammers, so that in equilibrium most or all spam will move
to the advertising (“open”) channel. The inducement to spammers is two-fold:
in the open channel they can provide higher-quality information to potential
customers (because there are no filters to evade), and as high-quality adver-
tising leaves the regular email channel, it will be easier to filter the remaining
low-quality spam, thus reducing the value (the “hit rate”) of sending to the
regular channel in the first place.
6.2. Manipulation
We already discussed one type of bad stuff: pollution. Pollution is a side-
effect: a content contributor is trying to accomplish something (say, promote
her products), with an indirect cost that she is cluttering a UCC resource (like
a blog, or an inbox) with content outside the intended scope of that resource.
The polluter doesn’t gain from the side effect itself. In this section we turn to a
different type of bad stuff: manipulation. Content intended to manipulate is the
flip side of pollution: the contributor usually doesn’t care about her contribution
itself, but makes the contribution precisely to cause the harm.
Thus, in general terms, by manipulation in a UCC setting we mean con-
tribution of content of the type for which the system is intended, but for the
purpose of having a deceptive or misleading effect on the choices made by other
users. Of course, based on the particular type of UCC, manipulation takes a
different form. Here we discuss two main types: misleading textual content and
numeric manipulations.
6.2.1. Misleading textual content
Many examples of manipulation have drawn attention in the past few years.
Some of the most striking have been book reviews presented as the views of in-
dependent third parties, but in fact published by someone (under a pseudonym)
with a direct financial interest with the intent of manipulating book sales. That
such manipulation occurs has been known since at least 2004, when a soft-
ware error on Amazon’s Canadian site temporarily revealed the true authors of
reviews [Dellarocas, 2006, Harmon, 2004]. Most reported cases have involved
authors who wrote favorable reviews of their own books, but a recent case in-
volved negative manipulation. Orlando Figes, a highly regarded historian at the
University of London, recently blamed his wife for pseudonymously penning poi-
sonous reviews of books by other historians on topics related to his (while also
writing fatuous paeans to Figes’s works). A week later he recanted, acknowl-
edging that he in fact wrote the false reviews; later he agreed to pay monetary
damages to two of the authors he attacked [Lea, 2010, Topping, 2010].
In another example, two founders of GiveWell admitted that they posted
false-name recommendations steering people to their organization. This case
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is particularly piquant because GiveWell is a nonprofit to help people evaluate
the quality (presumably, including reliability!) of nonprofit charitable organi-
zations, and GiveWell itself is supported by charitable donations. One of the
manipulations used a simple method: the executive posted a question on the Ask
Metafilter service in which he sought recommendations for information about
charities, then using a second pseudonym he posted a response recommending
his own service [Strom, 2008a,b].
Sites that aggregate news stories are a natural target for manipulation.
Digg.com is one of the more successful. Users post links to news stories found
elsewhere on the web. Other users then vote on the interest or significance of
the story (the “digg” it, or not), and those stories most highly rated are pre-
sented on the front page of the site (or the front page of several topical areas).
In 2006 a story that Google was going to acquire Sun Microsystems was pro-
moted to the front page. It is dubious whether the rumor was true (in any case,
Google never made a public offer for Sun), and some investigators concluded
that the story was a ruse, with a group collaborating to promote it in order
to manipulate stock prices for a short-term trading gain [Gray, 2006]. Others
have found evidence that a small group of frequent participants have regularly
manipulated which stories are promoted to the front page, though no one has
admitted publicly to doing so [Hayward, 2006].
Many observers express concern about the reliability of Wikipedia: students
and others rely heavily on this encyclopedia as a first (and often only) source
of facts, yet because it is a wiki, any user can change any content at any time,
with no guarantee that the changes are correct. There have been several in-
stances of intentional manipulation by users violating a rule against first-person
editing (that is, editing entries about oneself). The most amusing were multiple
revisions by Wikipedia’s own founder, Jimmy Wales, of the entry about him,
to reduce or eliminate discussion about his earlier business activities in online
pornography and revise the recounting of the founding of Wikipedia (these inci-
dents, of course, are now documented in Wikipedia) [Hansen, 2005, Wikipedia,
2010a]. The staff of several U.S. senators and representatives have been caught
modifying the biographies of their employers [Davis, 2006].
6.2.2. Numeric manipulations
Manipulation can also occur in systems that collect, aggregate, and publish
numeric ratings, such as those on Epinions, Netflix or Amazon’s product rec-
ommendation system. Such systems can be manipulated by injecting dishonest
ratings into the system. Google’s search is a special kind of rating system (in
which one user’s Web links to the Web pages of another are the (indirectly)
contributed ratings). It collects votes in a binary format which are susceptible
to manipulations Altman and Tennenholtz [2005], Cheng and Friedman [2005].
The same is true for social tagging systems, e.g., Del.icio.us [Ramezani et al.,
2008]. These types of manipulations are known as “shilling” or “sybil” attacks,
because they use a large number of fake user identities, i.e., sybils, to provide
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misleading ratings.25
Recommender systems such as MovieLens or NetFlix are prone to sybil at-
tacks as well [O’Mahony et al., 2002, Lam and Riedl, 2004]. An attacker first
use the sybils to rate a number of movies to establish similarity in tastes with
some users in the system. Then she can use all the sybils to rate one target
movie highly, so as to influence the system to recommend this movie to all the
users who share similar tastes with the sybils. Attacks using these profiles can
increase the chance of a target item appearing on any user’s recommendation
list by 19 times [Lam and Riedl, 2004]. Solutions have been proposed to make
recommender systems resistant to sybil attacks. For example, Chirita et al.
[2005], O’Mahony et al. [2006], Mehta et al. [2007] demonstrate that statisti-
cal metrics can be quite effective in detecting, hence eliminating shills 26. The
problem of this approach though, is that the effects are temporary; that is, it
leads to an arms-race. Resnick and Sami have developed recommender systems
that are provably resistant to sybil attacks using an influence-limiter method
[Resnick and Sami, 2007b, 2008].
6.2.3. Reputation systems to reduce manipulation
Reputation systems can be effective in reducing the influence of manipulators
in at least two ways. One can use the reputation information of the content
provider to filter out potential illegitimate content: a contributor with a low
reputation score might not be trustworthy. Further, the negative effect of low
reputation scores might discourage potential manipulation, as one has to build
a sufficiently good reputation profile in order to exert influence.
A well-functioning reputation system requires persistent user identities. Some
UCC systems either encourage or require real-world identity. For example, Citi-
zendium (citizendium.org), a user-contributed online encyclopedia, requires and
verifies that its voluntary editors use their real names. When comparing itself
to Wikipedia it asserts that its real-name policy provides its articles “a kind of
real-world credibility” [Citizendium, 2010]. Nonetheless, in many UCC systems
it is relatively inexpensive to create new identities, which enables manipulators
to whitewash their identities. Though widespread use of cheap pseudonyms
undercut the usefulness of a reputation system, there may be an equilibrium
in which reputation still has some value. Friedman and Resnick showed situa-
tions in which a user has to “pay her dues” before she can enjoy the benefits of
participation on a UCC platform [Friedman and Resnick, 2001].
One natural way to limit manipulation is to only trust “word-of-mouth”, that
is, opinions of trusted acquaintances. A UCC system can allow each consumer to
hand-pick the contributors that she trusts as friends, and then provide aggregate
ratings that give higher weight to these friends. Such a circle of friends can also
extend to friends’ friends, forming a “web of trust” [Massa and Avesani, 2005,
25These attacks are named after the famous case of the woman known as Sybil, who suffered
from multiple-personality disorder, [Schreiber, 1989].
26See Mobasher et al. [2007] for a literature survey of statistical solutions to defend recom-
mender systems from shilling attacks.
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Massa and Bhattacharjee, 2004, Massa and Avesani, 2005, Guha et al., 2004].
For example, Epinions.com uses a “web of trust” system to make recommender
systems robust to malicious manipulation27. As long as the manipulators do
not gain trust from any of the legitimate users, such a system can be effective
in preventing manipulations.
Alternatively, rather than relying on user inputs to construct a web of trust,
Resnick and Sami [2007a] propose generating a trust graph based on users’
rating histories. For recommendee A, other users each have a reputation score
indicating how much they have contributed to recommending good items to A
in the past. These users’ reputation scores are used to weigh their influence
on the future recommendations to A. Since this reputation system takes into
account the order in which ratings are submitted, it rewards raters contributing
unique and timely opinions, which is something shills cannot do well. Such a
reputation system can put an upper bound on how much influence shills can
have.
Making rating, recommendation, and reputation systems manipulation-resistant
is an active research area. A detailed discussion of the proposals made in various
systems is certainly beyond the scope of this article. Here we only discussed a
few approaches that apply across a general set of rating, recommendation, and
reputation systems. We refer our readers to Friedman et al. [2007] for a detailed
discussion.
7. SUMMARY
In this chapter we reviewed incentive-centered design for user-contributed con-
tent (UCC) systems or services on the Internet. UCC systems, produced (in
part) through voluntary contributions made by nonemployees, face fundamental
incentives problems. In particular, to succeed, users need to be motivated to
contribute in the first place (“getting stuff in”). Further, given heterogeneity in
content quality and variety, the degree of success will depend on incentives to
contribute a desirable mix of quality and variety (“getting good stuff in”). Third,
because UCC systems generally function as open-access publishing platforms,
there is a need to prevent or reduce the amount of negative value (polluting or
manipulating) content.
We have taken a somewhat multidisciplinary approach to the questions,
though we draw mostly on the economics literature in asymmetric information
and mechanism design. We point out some useful theories and findings from
other areas, in particular social psychology, but we think there is much valuable
work to be done to bring the economics of rational individual motivation and
the psychology of social-regarding motivation together, particularly to work on
problems such as UCC, which necessarily involves productive activity in social
publics, an activity that often requires cooperation or collaboration.
Our review of the theoretical and empirical literatures bearing on the incen-
tives problems facing UCC reveal an important finding: the work done to date
27See the Web of Trust FAQ http://www.epinions.com/help/faq/?show=faq_wot.
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on these problems is limited, and uneven in coverage. Much of the empirical
research concerns specific settings and does not provide readily generalizable
results. And, although there are well-developed theoretical literatures on, for
example, the private provision of public goods (the “getting stuff in” problem),
this literature is only applicable to UCC in a limited way because it focuses
on contributions of (homogeneous) money, and thus does not address the many
problems associated with heterogeneous information content contributions (the
“getting good stuff in” problem). We believe that our review of the literature
has identified more open questions for research than it has pointed to known
results.
User-contributed content is a fascinating, and clearly important phenomenon
enabled by the development of the Internet and tools for user participation
generally known as Web 2.0. How successful UCC ventures will be — whether as
for-profit, or as non-profit organizations aiming to improve social welfare — will
depend critically on the ability to solve the fundamental incentives challenges
they face.
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